

## THE IMPORT OF ATTIC POTTERY TO CORINTH AND THE QUESTION OF TRADE DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

THROUGHOUT the Peloponnesian War, no state remained as aggressively hostile toward Athens as Corinth. Following the affairs of Corcyra and Poteidaia, Corinth successfully argued that war be declared against Athens. After ten years of fighting, when Sparta agreed to the Peace of Nikias, Corinth refused to accept its terms and make peace with Athens. We know that Corinth and Athens were directly engaged in hostilities in 419 and 416 and were on opposing sides in the fighting between Epidauros and Argos in 418.<sup>1</sup> After Athens sent forces against Sicily in the summer of 415, Corinth voted independently to support Syracuse and encouraged Sparta to increase hostilities against Athens in both Greece and Sicily.<sup>2</sup> When the Peloponnesian War came to an end in 404 with the final Athenian defeat, Corinth continued to oppose peace with Athens and urged that the city be destroyed.<sup>3</sup>

This political antagonism toward the Athenian state, so well documented in our historical sources, has also been inferred from Corinth's archaeological record. It has often been suggested that the import of Attic pottery was stopped or sharply curtailed during the Peloponnesian War. Palmer's analysis of the grave goods in Corinth's North Cemetery, particularly the Attic and Corinthian lekythoi, led her to conclude that 'at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War all importing stopped, and the Corinthian potters were forced to make out for themselves either by imitating traditional forms or by attempting to produce vases comparable to those they thought were being made in Athens.'<sup>4</sup> Luce suggests that potters at Corinth produced such imitations not simply in reaction to a cessation of Attic imports but rather in an attempt 'to keep this highly lucrative branch of the ceramic industry in local hands'.<sup>5</sup> When Attic pottery is absent in late fifth-century graves at Corinth's Lechaion Cemetery, the situation is interpreted as 'one of the sad side effects of the Peloponnesian War'.<sup>6</sup> When Attic pottery of the late fifth century is found, its presence is considered unusual; Herbert, for example, suggests that only a restricted range of Attic pottery was available, probably reaching Corinth through a third party, because Corinthians 'could not communicate with an Attic potter to order anything specific or depend upon receiving anything at a specific time'.<sup>7</sup>

The strongest evidence in favor of such a wartime embargo is found in Corinth's North Cemetery. Here during the last third of the fifth century a decline in Attic imports is apparent, prompted in part by locally produced grave goods that imitate the Attic wares. However, the decline actually began a number of years before the war, shortly after the middle of the fifth century. Even with this progressive decline in imports, the presence of Attic pottery in some graves dating to the war years shows that it continued to be available in Corinth and remained a suitable funeral offering. Further analysis suggests that other factors besides the war played a part in the decline of Attic pottery as a grave offering, while a review of late fifth-century settlement contexts shows that Attic pottery remained popular among the living. Moreover, the idea of

<sup>1</sup> Thuc. v 17.2, 52.2, 115.3, 57.2. For Corinth's role in the battle of Mantinea in 418, see Thuc. v 75.2. The only official communication between Corinth and Athens during this period occurred in the summer of 421 when Corinthian envoys went to Athens to ask for a special truce, but their request was rejected (Thuc. v 32.5-6).

<sup>2</sup> Thuc. vi 88.7-8.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. *Hell.* ii 2.19.

<sup>4</sup> H. Palmer in C. Blegen, R. S. Young, and H. Palmer, *Corinth* xiii: *The North Cemetery* (Princeton 1964) 121.

<sup>5</sup> S. B. Luce, *AJA* xxxiv (1930) 341.

<sup>6</sup> C. W. J. Eliot and M. Eliot, *Hesperia* xxxvii (1968) 347.

<sup>7</sup> S. Herbert, *Corinth* vii Pt iv: *The Red-figure Pottery* (Princeton 1977) 4. Similarly, when Attic pottery dating to the war years is found at the Corinthian sanctuary of Perachora, P. Corbett, *Perachora* ii (Oxford 1962) 350, claims 'it is not evidence for direct trade between Athens and Perachora' but only represents the gear of travelers, although the presence of some shapes such as kraters, jugs, and squat lekythoi suggests otherwise.

regular state interference in the trade of non-essential items such as pottery, even during wartime, is not supported by our historical sources.

### I. ATTIC POTTERY IN CORINTHIAN CEMETERIES

Athenian pots were used as grave offerings in the North Cemetery during the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries but were usually less popular than the local ware. In contrast to the normal pattern, however, Attic pottery became the dominant type during the first half of the fifth century. In the 89 graves with grave goods that date from 500 to around 445, 273 Athenian pots were found, over three quarters the total number of Attic imports in the North Cemetery.<sup>8</sup> Toward the middle of the century, Attic pottery easily outnumbered the local ware.

Interestingly, the time of heaviest import parallels an earlier period of hostilities between Corinth and Athens. The new alliance between Athens and Megara that existed from around 460 until 446 may explain Corinth's active involvement in the first Peloponnesian War.<sup>9</sup> Yet, despite the war, 136 pots have been excavated in the 35 graves in the North Cemetery that can be dated between 460 and 445—an incidence of nearly four Athenian pots per grave.<sup>10</sup> The large quantity of Attic imports at this time argues against the idea of a trade embargo in pottery during wartime, a fact that is ignored by those who support the idea of an embargo during the late fifth-century war.

It is in the period between the first and second Peloponnesian wars, during the third quarter of the fifth century, that this unusually high incidence of Attic imports in the North Cemetery comes to an end; the break seems to occur around 445. In sharp contrast to the statistics noted above for the preceding half-century, the 93 graves with grave goods dating between 445 and 395 contained only 32 Attic pots.<sup>11</sup> Because this decline in the use of Attic products began at a time when Corinth was not formally hostile toward the Athenian state, it does not reflect the political situation.<sup>12</sup> However, it could reflect changes in pottery production at that time, as an examination of the available Attic and Corinthian pottery styles suggests.

With the Athenian pottery, perhaps the most important change came around the middle of the fifth century when production of Attic black-figure, a style common in Corinthian graves, came to an end. Surprisingly, Attic red-figure, although it had been produced in Athens since the sixth century, never became a popular grave offering and did not replace the black-figured imports now (only seven examples have been found in the North Cemetery). Palmer suggests that Corinthian conservatism may have prevented its use as a funeral offering.<sup>13</sup> The remaining Attic imports included black-glazed pottery in a limited number of shapes and the more numerous white-ground and ivy lekythoi.

<sup>8</sup> *Corinth* xiii, graves 259–63, 265–9, 271, 272, 273 (?), 274–302, 304–8, 320–47, 349, 351–5, 358–60, and deposits D7–D10, D47.

<sup>9</sup> See Thuc. i 103.4.

<sup>10</sup> *Corinth* xiii, graves 322–47, 349, 351–5, 358–60.

<sup>11</sup> *Corinth* xiii, graves 348, 350, 356, 357, 361–74, 378–433, 435, 436, 438, and deposits D11–D22, D48–D51.

<sup>12</sup> G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London/Ithaca 1972) 213, claims Megara's realignment with the Peloponnesian states in 446 marks a new phase in Corinthian–Athenian relations, a period 'if not of friendliness, at least of indifference and neutrality' (attested by Thuc. i 40.5).

<sup>13</sup> *Corinth* xiii 152. Attic red-figure is also rare in the cemetery of Rhitsona in Boiotia: two cups (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 140, 381) have been excavated, both from grave 22. But unlike Corinth's North Cemetery, Attic pottery was never popular at Rhitsona during the fifth century. In

graves 131, 22, 22a, 21, 113, 46, and 36 of the early fifth century, Attic imports, primarily black-figured lekythoi and skyphoi, represent less than 15% of the pottery offered. A few pots continued to be imported (see graves 52, 108, 76, 139) until the black-figured style came to an end in Athens; at that time local potters began producing their own black-figured imitations. Originally A. D. Ure suggested that introduction of this local ware was caused by a cessation of imports from Athens after the Peloponnesian War began, but noted later that the imitations began earlier than the war and came in response to changes in Athenian pottery, not politics; see *BSA* xli (1940–5) 26. The most popular offering by far in Rhitsona's fifth-century graves was the local black-glazed kantharos, a shape not favored by contemporary Attic potters; see B. Sparkes and L. Talcott, *Athenian Agora* xii (Princeton 1970) 113–17. For a bibliography of the Rhitsona graves, see Sparkes, *JHS* lxxxvii (1967) 129–30.

In competition with the Attic products, Corinthian potters produced their own black-glazed ware; in fact this fabric was the most popular of the Corinthian work.<sup>14</sup> In the third quarter of the fifth century Corinthian potters also began producing white-ground and ivy lekythoi in imitation of the Attic product, and these soon became a popular grave offering.<sup>15</sup> Further, locally made fine unglazed pottery became popular around the middle of the fifth century.<sup>16</sup>

Thus sufficient evidence exists that conditions adversely affecting the import of Attic pottery to Corinth developed before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Although some Attic imports continue to be found in graves dating between 445 and 430,<sup>17</sup> Corinthian pottery once again became the predominant grave offering in the North Cemetery.

Still, Palmer believes that wartime events are reflected in the decline of Attic imports and even more in the production of the Corinthian imitations. She divides the Corinthian lekythoi into three groups. Those of group (i) are accurate copies of Attic work of the third quarter of the fifth century. Group (ii) represents a deviation from the Attic prototype. Group (iii) marks a return to Athenian influence and is comparable to Attic lekythoi of the last quarter of the fifth century. In an attempt to fit this stylistic analysis into an historical framework, Palmer proposes that group (i) represents the period before the war; group (ii) the first decade of the war, a time when Corinthian potters were deprived of Attic models; and group (iii) a period when models were again available for a short time, 'when relations were briefly resumed, very possibly in 421' (although a political rapprochement between Corinth and Athens did not occur at this time). However, Palmer admits that the groups overlap considerably and that within each group the lekythoi show no clear development.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to suggesting an excessive dependence on Attic models by those potters working in Corinth, her combined stylistic and historical analysis is based on the assumption that the war eliminated completely the importing of Attic pottery. Without such reference to the historical record and the assumption of a wartime embargo, group (i) and group (iii) could represent the products of an Atticizing style that copied contemporary Attic lekythoi of the third and fourth quarters of the fifth century, and group (ii) the local style whose production overlaps that of groups (i) and (iii). The recent publication of two imported Corinthian lekythoi of Palmer's group (iii) from the Thespian Polyandron of 424<sup>19</sup> and the continued presence of Attic pottery in the North Cemetery support this interpretation.

Attic grave offerings found in the North Cemetery that can be securely dated to the war years include four squat lekythoi, three bowls, two lekythoi, a skyphos, and an amphoriskos.<sup>20</sup> These imports are comparable to the number and variety of Attic pots that date to the years immediately before the war, with the exception of the patterned lekythoi. However, although it is clear that these Attic funerary lekythoi were eventually replaced by the Corinthian imitations, their import may not have declined as rapidly as Palmer suggests. In fact her discussion of three graves, which she dates to 'the third quarter of the fifth century', tends to contradict her historical assumption that the Peloponnesian War curtailed the import of Attic pottery after 431.

Grave 362, for example, contains an Attic pattern lekythos and three Corinthian pots. The Corinthian pot that allows the closest dating, a rounded skyphos, compares closely with other skyphoi that are found in graves without Attic pottery that Palmer dates to the late third, early

<sup>14</sup> *Corinth* xiii 120.

<sup>15</sup> *Corinth* xiii 121. For earlier experiments in a white-ground style, see E. Pemberton, *Archaeol.* xxxi (1978) 27-33.

<sup>16</sup> *Corinth* xiii 120.

<sup>17</sup> Attic imports that can be dated between 445 and 430 include seven lekythoi, three skyphoi, one krater, and a miniature bowl (*Corinth* xiii, nos 356-5, 357-10, 361-6, 381-2, D11-c, D11-d, D11-e, D11-f, D11-g, D12-i, D13-c, D19-d). Palmer's historical analysis suggests that she would include in this group six

lekythoi and one skyphos from three graves that she dates to 'the third quarter of the fifth century', but her discussion of the contents of graves 362, 363, and 364 permits a dating in the final years of the third quarter, as noted below, suggesting that the Attic pots may have been imported during the war years.

<sup>18</sup> *Corinth* xiii 121.

<sup>19</sup> D. U. Schilardi, *The Thespian Polyandron (424 B.C.)* (Diss. Princeton 1977) 137, nos 34 and 35.

<sup>20</sup> *Corinth* xiii, nos 365-6, 399-4, 403-8, 404-6, 404-7, 409-12, 418-14, 421-3, 422-13, 426-17, and 426-18.

fourth quarter of the fifth century.<sup>21</sup> Grave 363 contains two Attic pattern lekythoi, as well as a Corinthian ribbed, round-mouthed oinochoe, a type that 'first occur(s) toward the end of the third quarter of the fifth century'.<sup>22</sup> Grave 364 contains three Attic ivy lekythoi and an Attic pattern skyphos that is similar to skyphoi dated to the last quarter of the fifth century.<sup>23</sup> Of the two Corinthian pots, the semi-glazed skyphos is a type that was introduced after the middle of the third quarter of the fifth century, while the round-mouthed oinochoe is known elsewhere in the North Cemetery during the third quarter of the fifth century and later examples have come from settlement contexts.<sup>24</sup>

While Palmer's general dating to the third quarter of the fifth century is correct, these three graves, when considered without reference to the historical record, do not suggest a cessation of Attic imports by 431. In fact all the grave goods, including the skyphos and six lekythoi of Athenian manufacture, can reasonably be assigned a date at the end of the third quarter of the fifth century. Some or all of the Attic pottery may have been imported during the war.

Similar historical assumptions may have led to the dating of Grave C6 in the Lechaion Cemetery to the middle or third quarter of the fifth century, although the grave goods, one Attic and two Corinthian pots, would fit more comfortably in the late third or fourth quarter of the fifth century. The Corinthian pottery includes a semi-glazed skyphos with a heavy foot, a type that is popular around the middle of the fifth century but continues throughout the third quarter, and a banded miniature lekythos, a type that extends throughout the second half of the fifth century but enjoys its greatest popularity in the nearby North Cemetery around the end of the third and early fourth quarters of the fifth century.<sup>25</sup> The single Attic vase, a squat lekythos, was popular in Athens by the third quarter of the fifth century but did not become a popular import in Corinth until late in the century, as shown by those found in the North Cemetery.<sup>26</sup>

Other graves in the area provide additional evidence. Two red-figured lekythoi of the late fifth century have been found in a woman's grave of the late fifth century outside the North City Wall;<sup>27</sup> an Attic white-ground lekythos, a red-figured chous, and a miniature amphora, all dated to the war years, are among a group of illicitly excavated grave goods;<sup>28</sup> and two white-ground lekythoi of the late fifth century, one by the Reed Painter, are catalogued by Beazley.<sup>29</sup>

Thus despite a decline that began in the years before the Peloponnesian War following changes in Attic and Corinthian pottery styles, a selection of Attic pottery continued to be found in Corinthian graves throughout the late fifth century. Attic pottery has also been found in graves of other states that were at war with Athens in the late fifth century. However no site provides an historical and archaeological picture comparable to that of Corinth; some do not have a quantity of Attic pottery regularly imported over a long period of time,<sup>30</sup> others cannot

<sup>21</sup> Compare the rounded skyphos, *Corinth* xiii, no. 362-2, with other skyphoi, nos 367-6, 367-7, and 395-5.

<sup>22</sup> *Corinth* xiii 138.

<sup>23</sup> Palmer, *Corinth* xiii, compares no. 364-7 to the group VI skyphoi, nos 7 and 9, catalogued by S. Howard and F. P. Johnson, *AJA* lviii (1954) 206.

<sup>24</sup> For the skyphos and oinochoe, nos 364-5 and 364-6, see the comments of Palmer, *Corinth* xiii 125-6, 238-9.

<sup>25</sup> *Hesperia* xxxvii (1968) 345-67, nos 56, 57.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 58. Herbert, *Corinth* vii Pt iv, 16 n. 24, also prefers a date in 'the last quarter of the 5th century'.

<sup>27</sup> *Corinth* vii Pt iv, 16 n. 24, C-32-26 and C-32-142.

<sup>28</sup> L. Shoe, *Hesperia* i (1932) 56-89, nos MP93 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1245), MP113, MP125.

<sup>29</sup> *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1375 and 1379.

<sup>30</sup> Graves at Olynthos have produced a few Attic pots dating before and during the war; see D. M. Robinson, *Excavations at Olynthus* v (Baltimore 1933) nos 132, 152 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1401), 249 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1203), 250.

Graves at Tegea have produced a more significant amount of Attic pottery dating throughout the last third of the fifth century, although here comparative material predating the war is absent; see C. Dugas, *BCH* li (1927) 320-44, with *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1325 and 1365, and *Agora* xii 94-6, 170-1, and 100 n. 3. Attic pottery was also found in the state burial for those Thespians slaughtered by the Athenians at Delion in 424 (Thuc. iv 96.3). Like the other grave goods, the various Attic imports can be dated to the decade or so before the burial and no wartime break is apparent (Schilardi, *Thespian Polyandria*, nos 36, 70, 321, 356, 357, 380, perhaps 358 and 359); three kylikes (nos 130-2) may be imports from another enemy state, Euboia. In addition, Boiotian copies show familiarity with Attic pottery in the years just before the war—a Polygnotan-style krater and lekythoi imitating the Achilles Painter's work; and in the war's first decade—a pyxis imitating the Washing Painter's style, white-ground lekythoi, and black-glazed cup-skyphoi (nos 1, 8-10, and 37, 30-2, 169-71).

claim a lengthy and unbroken period of hostilities.<sup>31</sup> The available evidence nevertheless supports the conclusions drawn from the Corinthian material.

## II. ATTIC POTTERY IN CORINTHIAN SETTLEMENT CONTEXTS

A concentrated survey of Attic pottery in Corinth during this period is provided by the agora well deposit, which includes Attic black- and red-figure and black-glaze, various Corinthian styles, and a few Corinthian imitations of Attic wares, all dated by Pease between 460 and 420.<sup>32</sup> The Attic red-figured fragments represent twenty vases that apparently span the entire period that the well was in use. Among the later pieces are a calyx krater that Pease compared to the work of the Phiale Painter, an attribution later confirmed by Beazley; two bell kraters that 'recall(s) the Phiale Painter'; a third bell krater; another calyx krater; and a squat lekythos.<sup>33</sup> Although these pots do not allow a precise dating, some were probably imported during the war years.

The Attic black-glazed ware from the well also appears representative of the period 460 to 420. The Attic and Corinthian type skyphoi compare with those produced during the third quarter of the fifth century and examples of each appear to date to the last decade the well was in use.<sup>34</sup> A ribbed two-handled mug compares with material from the Athenian agora dated around 430 and an oinochoe can be assigned a similar date.<sup>35</sup> The stamped cup-skyphoi are especially popular toward the end of this period, and both their shape and design compare with cups from the Athenian agora dated 425 to 420.<sup>36</sup> Pease believes an oinochoe with a trefoil lip may be one of the well's later pieces, and a low bowl and mug with straight sides appear to be late fifth-century shapes.<sup>37</sup> Attic imports are represented during the entire period that the well was in use and a wartime break is not apparent.<sup>38</sup>

Nearby, in the area between the central shops and south stoa, a later well was uncovered, packed with late fifth-century pottery. In contrast to the agora well deposit, the excavators noted a large proportion of Corinthian red-figure, a style whose popularity in the decade 420 to 410 probably was due to the arrival of the Attic-trained Suessula Painter.<sup>39</sup> However, the well still contained a variety of Attic imports.<sup>40</sup> Unlike the local white-ground pottery, Corinthian

However, like the grave goods at Rhitsona, the Attic or Attic-inspired pottery represents a small fraction of the total, and the most common offering is again the local black-glazed kantharos.

<sup>31</sup> Graves at Halieis, for example, a state that switched sides and accepted an Athenian garrison for part of the war beginning in 424/3 (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 75), have produced Attic pottery dating throughout the fifth century; see C. Dengate, *ADelt* xxxi (1976) 274–324. It is also difficult to correlate pottery imports with the sporadic periods of hostilities in the West. We can note, however, the continued presence of Attic pottery throughout the second half of the fifth century, irrespective of the political situation, in the cemetery of Vassallaggi, an inland site approached through Sicily's southern coast; see P. Orlandini, *Vassallaggi. Scavi 1960. i: La necropoli meridionale*, *NSc* suppl. xxv (1971).

<sup>32</sup> M. Z. Pease, *Hesperia* vi (1937) 257–316, hereafter Pease.

<sup>33</sup> Pease, nos 17 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1017); 10 and 14 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1025); and 6, 18, and 20.

<sup>34</sup> Pease believes an Attic-type skyphos, no. 28, is taller and thinner than examples of the third quarter of the fifth century and signals the changes that are to take place in the shape toward the end of the century. A Corinthian-type skyphos from the well, no. 37, com-

pares with one from the Athenian agora dated around 425 (*Agora* xii, no. 320).

<sup>35</sup> Pease, nos 61 (with *Agora* xii, no. 228) and 54.

<sup>36</sup> Pease, nos 40–4, compares their decoration with a Rheneia cup (*Agora* xii, no. 463) dated around 425; for the shape, see *Agora* xii, no. 541, dated around 420.

<sup>37</sup> Pease, nos 53, 48, and 64, compares the shape of the low bowl with a salt cellar from Athens (*Agora* xii, no. 913), the latter dated from 430 to 400; bowls with a ring foot and similar underside decoration, such as *Agora* xii, no. 871, have a similar dating range. And Pease compares the mug to one found on Rhodes in a context dating to about 400.

<sup>38</sup> As noted by Herbert, *Corinth* vii Pt iv, 17–18: 'many of the Attic vases date to the decade 430–420 . . . in spite of the Peloponnesian War, Attic pottery was still being imported in some quantity'.

<sup>39</sup> The Suessula Painter's emigration to Corinth parallels the movements of other Attic-trained potters who left Athens to establish pottery schools elsewhere during the late fifth century; see B. R. MacDonald, *AJA* lxxxv (1981) 162–3.

<sup>40</sup> C. H. Morgan, *AJA* xli (1937) 547–8 and fig. 11. Herbert, *Corinth* vii Pt iv, 18, discusses four late fifth century skyphoi and J. D. Beazley, *BSA* xli (1940–5) 17, has catalogued a squat lekythos from this largely unpublished well.

red-figure never replaced its Attic counterpart. In fact, both fabrics appear in quantity in late fifth-century settlement contexts: 'every deposit that produced a large amount of Corinthian red-figure also produced a comparable amount of Attic'.<sup>41</sup>

Attic pottery of the last third of the fifth century has been found in other excavated areas of Corinth. Catalogues by Boulter and McPhee have substantially increased the number of published Attic imports; they list fifteen kraters, four stemless cups, three squat lekythoi, one pelike, fragments of two closed vases, and an epinetron that span the period of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>42</sup> Luce's earlier catalogue of Attic red-figure includes a squat lekythos and a kylix of late fifth-century date.<sup>43</sup> And Beazley lists a krater and a squat lekythos that date to the last third of the fifth century and have a Corinthian provenience.<sup>44</sup> The presence of Attic pottery in the settlement material of Corinth shows that the war had little effect on the pottery trade.<sup>45</sup>

Just as Corinthians continued to buy Attic fine ware during the war, Athenians still purchased the popular coarse pottery of Corinth. Storage bins, jugs, askoi, lekanides, louteria, and mortars, all of Corinthian manufacture and dated throughout the second half of the fifth century, have been excavated in the Athenian agora. In addition, Corinthian fine ware is represented by three banded oinochoai of the last quarter of the fifth century.<sup>46</sup>

### III. STATE INTERFERENCE IN TRADE DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Rather than suggesting the severance of economic contacts during the Peloponnesian War, the archaeological evidence indicates that the pottery trade continued between Athens and Corinth throughout the late fifth century.<sup>47</sup> Apparently the actual state of war did not seriously disrupt such trade nor was an official or popular embargo on the import and export of pottery encouraged. Our historical sources do not suggest that warring states regularly interfered with the trade of a non-essential item such as pottery, and thus do not contradict the archaeological

<sup>41</sup> Herbert, *Corinth* vii Pt iv, 3.

<sup>42</sup> C. G. Boulter and J. L. Bentz, *Hesperia* xlix (1980) 295–308, nos 31 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1095), 32 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1095), 33 (*Para.* 459), 34, and 35 (*Para.* 477); I. D. McPhee, *Hesperia* xlv (1976) 380–96, nos 2, 6, 7, 21, 23, 29, 36, 41, 46; and *Hesperia* l (1981) 264–84, nos 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 57 (McPhee 279–80 also refers to an unpublished deposit of Attic black-glaze that spans the fifth century).

<sup>43</sup> Luce, *AJA* xxxiv (1930) 334–43, nos 1 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1367) and 7.

<sup>44</sup> *ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1164 and 1330.

<sup>45</sup> Excavations of settlement contexts of other states at war with Athens have produced Attic pottery but provide limited information compared with Corinth. Attic pottery dating before and during the war, for example, has come from Olynthos; see *Olynthus* v, nos 101, 107, 114, 115, 117, 118, 120 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1100), 121, 122, 124, 129, 131, 161 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1092); Robinson, *Olynthus* xiii (Baltimore 1950) nos 10, 14, 41 (*ARV*<sup>2</sup> 1164). Excavations at Sparta 'produced a number of Attic black-glazed ware or a fabric indistinguishable from it, ranging from the middle to the end of the fifth century'; see J. M. Cook and R. V. Nichols, *BSA* xlv (1950) 291. Kythera, normally controlled by a Spartan garrison but seized by Athens in 424 and held perhaps until 409, presents an interesting mixture of late fifth-century material including various Attic, Lakonian, and Corinthian wares and Chian and Thasian wine amphorae; see J. N. Coldstream and G. L. Huxley (eds), *Kythera* (London/Park Ridge, N.J. 1972) 37–8, 159–65, 202–3. Attic pottery dating through the second

half of the fifth century has also been excavated at sanctuaries located within enemy states; see P. Wolters and G. Bruns, *Das Kabirenheiligtum bei Thebes* (Berlin 1940) 85–6; A. Mallwitz and W. Schiering, *Olympische Forschungen* v (Berlin 1964) 248–66; and *Perachora* ii, 350–8.

<sup>46</sup> *Agora* xii, nos 1546, 1556, 1676, 1677, 1679, 1683, 1687, 1730, 1731, 1833, 1841, 1845, 1860, 1865, 1897, 1907, 1914, 1915; and nos 168–70.

<sup>47</sup> Archaeological evidence has been used to suggest state interference in the trade of other items during the war but such evidence, while not contrary, is not persuasive. For example, C. M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (London/Berkeley 1976) 83–4, postulates that the limited production of Corinthian mints in the second half of the fifth century was the result of interference by the Athenian fleet during the war: Corinth's silver could have come 'from many commercial sources, but all of it had to come from abroad and was dependent upon the seaward approaches to Corinth remaining open'. His theory is seriously weakened, however, by the appearance of a major series of staters initiated by Sikyon around 430/20. Curiously, Kraay (p. 99) suggests that Sikyon became the principal mint of the Spartan alliance during the war because she was 'secured from all but occasional Athenian attack by her position deep within the Gulf of Corinth'. Because silver continued to be shipped to the northeast Peloponnese, the decline of the Corinthian mint at this time is due to some reason other than Athenian interference.

evidence. In fact, military or political interference in all trade during the Peloponnesian War appears to have been sporadic and of limited effect.

Military interference included Sparta's seizure of traders off the Peloponnesian coast in the summer of 430, apparently an isolated incident.<sup>48</sup> Athenian bases on Salamis and later on Minoa may have been used to disrupt Megarian trade, but according to Thucydides their purpose was primarily defensive: to prevent Peloponnesian triremes and privateers from using Nisaia as a base.<sup>49</sup> Another action that may have been directed against merchant ships as well as warships occurred in the winter of 430/29 when Phormio stationed twenty ships at Naupaktos to prevent access to the Gulf of Krisa.<sup>50</sup> Seventeen years later a squadron of Athenian ships was again based at Naupaktos, its mission specifically to prevent the passage of merchant ships, but by now both Corinth and Sparta were using merchant ships to transport hoplites; the Athenian action was apparently designed to stop ships carrying troops, not cargo. In this instance we know that the blockade failed.<sup>51</sup>

The Old Oligarch would have the Athenian fleet controlling the trade in shipbuilding materials, but such a claim could only be made by someone unaware of the sources of timber, iron, copper, and flax and their wide availability.<sup>52</sup> We can assume, however, that states would disrupt the supply of shipbuilding materials to the enemy if presented the opportunity, as when the Syracusans burned a quantity of timber intended for the Athenians at Kaulonia.<sup>53</sup> Other sources suggest that attempted military interference in the shipping of a particular cargo usually involved the grain trade. Athens' real aim in helping Leontini in 427 according to Thucydides was to prevent Sicilian grain from being shipped to the Peloponnese,<sup>54</sup> and Spartan actions off the coast of Karia and Lykia, off the headland of Knidos, and at the Hellespont all suggest attempts to interfere with the grain trade.<sup>55</sup> There is no evidence, however, that such actions by Athens or Sparta met with any success.

The Athenian presence in the Hellespont was primarily to insure the import of grain from the Black Sea to the Peiraieus.<sup>56</sup> In fact, Athens' apparent inability to control the Pontic grain

<sup>48</sup> Thuc. ii 67.4, with the comments of E. C. Marchant, *Thucydides: Book II* (London 1891, repr. 1961).

<sup>49</sup> Thuc. ii 93.4, 94.3; iii 51.

<sup>50</sup> Thuc. ii 69.1.

<sup>51</sup> Thuc. vii 17.3-4, 19.3-5.

<sup>52</sup> Old Oligarch, ii 2-4, 11-12. According to Theophrastus, areas producing shipbuilding timber include parts of Italy, Sicily, and Corsica; Macedonia, Thrace, and Arkadia; lands around Phrygian Ida, Sinope and Amisos, Mysian Olympos, and Cilicia; and Cyprus, Syria, and Phoenicia (*Hist. Pl.* iii 7.1; iv 1.2, 5.5; v 7.1, 8.1-3). Suitable timber also grew elsewhere on the numerous mountain ranges (*Hist. Pl.* iv 5.1; iii 2.5), and Theophrastus indicates that shipbuilders could use various woods for the different parts of a ship and usually could draw on local resources (*Hist. Pl.* iii 10.1; v 4.3, 7.1-5; also *Pl. Laws* 705c). Against the mistaken notion of extensive deforestation in antiquity, see M. B. Rowton, *JNES* xxvi (1967) 261-77, and J. L. Bintliff, *Natural Environment and Human Settlement in Prehistoric Greece* (Oxford 1977) 59-86. Unlike many regions, however, Attica was without extensive forest cover because of geological and climatic conditions, so here timber had to be imported. J. C. Waldbaum, *From Bronze to Iron* (Göteborg 1978) 59-66, concludes that iron deposits sufficient for local needs were available almost everywhere in Greece, Anatolia, and the Near East, and copper ores were also widespread but most abundant in Cyprus, Palestine, and Anatolia. Metal sources were also adequate in the West. Flax grew in Palestine, Egypt, Colchis, Carthage (*Hdt.* ii 105, vii

25.1; Hermippos *fr.* 63; Xen. *Kyn.* ii 4), and regions in Italy, Spain, Gaul, and Germany (Pliny *NH* xix 1-25). Flax was probably common in Greece as well, but our evidence cites only the western Peloponnese; see M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge 1973) 131, 413, 471; Thuc. iv 26.8; Paus. vi 26.6; and Chadwick, *Minos* vii (1963) 129.

<sup>53</sup> Thuc. vii 25.2.

<sup>54</sup> Thuc. iii 86.4.

<sup>55</sup> Thuc. ii 69.1; viii 35.2-3; Xen. *Hell.* ii 1.17.

<sup>56</sup> That Athens stored reserved stocks of grain at Byzantion is implied in the Methone decree (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 61), as noted by ML 180. Because Athens wished to keep Methone within her sphere of influence, the Methonians were able to exact a number of favors from the Athenians, including access to these grain reserves. Aphytis gained similar privileges (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 62). Grain may have normally been stockpiled at Byzantion to insure against a shortage at Athens, or to serve as a supply center for troops in the area (*cf.* Xen. *Hell.* iii 2.11, *Dem.* iv 32). Stockpiling grain for either reason could predate the war. Athens probably had garrisons in the area for some time (certainly after Byzantion revolted in 440), whose duty it was to keep watch over the strategic Hellespontine district. Although the *hellespontophylakes* referred to in the Methone decree are usually seen as some special board of Athenian officials regulating trade or rationing grain, the term simply refers to the forces stationed in the region and its use can be compared with references to *phylakes* on other Athenian decrees, such as those concerning Euboia, Erythrai, Miletos, and Aigina; as D. M. Lewis, *BSA* xlix (1954) 24, points out, the basic

trade of other states is suggested by events during the revolt of Mytilene early in the summer of 428. Despite being warned of Mytilene's preparations which included the stockpiling of grain and other goods imported from the Black Sea, Athens took no immediate steps to interfere with merchant ships that were supplying Mytilene. Later that summer, after political and military efforts to induce the Mytileneans to end their revolt failed, Athens established two fortified camps on Lesbos from which her fleet could operate and then blockaded Mytilene's harbors.<sup>57</sup>

The naval blockade was one military tactic that could have an economic impact, but it required the availability of suitable land bases from which to operate and a major commitment of time, money, and manpower, as the events at Mytilene and elsewhere make clear.<sup>58</sup> While these requirements would permit the regular patrols needed to blockade a single harbor, they effectively ruled out a blockade on a large scale, such as the coastline of a hostile state,<sup>59</sup> so even an attempt to impede trade and communication by blockade was by necessity a concentrated effort and its effect would be limited within the geographic boundaries chosen.<sup>60</sup>

There were also attempts to control trade by political means during the Peloponnesian War, but they suggest limited interest in the trade of enemy states. Although Andokides claimed on his return to Athens that he supplied oars, grain, and copper to the fleet at Samos, his political enemies charged that he likewise supplied grain and oars to the enemy, an accusation that led to his imprisonment.<sup>61</sup> As with instances of military interference, the state's interest again appears to be limited to preventing the strategically important grain and shipbuilding materials from reaching the enemy. In fact, concerning involvement in other forms of interstate trade, a disputed passage in Antiphon suggests that commercial contracts between citizens of states at war were legally acceptable;<sup>62</sup> such an understanding may have been necessary in a world in which warfare was common and the resulting alliances both varied and fluid.

Most political actions were concerned not with the trade of enemy states but with the import of vital commodities. That Athens attempted to guarantee the import of shipbuilding timber from Macedonia is shown in her decrees with Perdikkas and Archelaos; the promise that Athens extracted from Perdikkas to sell oars only to Athens probably reflects Athens' interest in insuring her own supply more than in preventing shipments to other states.<sup>63</sup> Athens also granted privileges to individual traders to encourage continued service to the state. The association of Lykon the Achaian with Athenian garrisons suggests a trade in grain or other provisions, while the Andrian Phanosthenes and his associates are specifically encouraged to import oars; honors were also granted during the Peloponnesian War to Pythophanes, apparently a merchant from either Karystos or Phaistos.<sup>64</sup> None of these merchants was forbidden to trade with enemy states, although the fragmentary final clause of the Lykon decree could either restrict his trade within the Gulf (of Corinth) or alternatively not include trade within the Gulf; the second interpretation suggests that if Lykon was found trading within the Gulf—at such enemy states as Sikyon, Corinth, or Pegai—he could not claim his special Athenian status.<sup>65</sup>

meaning of *phylake* in these inscriptions is abstract, something like watch, defense, or blockade. Also see Thuc. viii 62.3, 80.4, Xen. *Hell.* i 1.22 and 36 concerning the Hellespont. As with the rest of the decree, the Athenians were here guaranteeing the Methoneans special treatment at the hands of these Athenian forces stationed in the Hellespont.

<sup>57</sup> Thuc. iii 2–6.

<sup>58</sup> To pay for the blockade of Mytilene, Athens had to levy a special tax on her own citizens and raise extra funds from her allies. In addition to the naval blockade the Athenians were forced to build a wall around Mytilene to eliminate her access to the countryside. Mytilene still held out for a year (Thuc. iii 6.2, 18.3–19, 27.1).

<sup>59</sup> A. W. Gomme, *JHS* liii (1933) 23.

<sup>60</sup> At the second meeting of the allies at Sparta, the Corinthian delegate was probably referring to the threat of such an Athenian naval blockade when he claimed that if the inland states did not come to the aid of those on the coast, they would eventually have more difficulty in exporting and importing (Thuc. i 120.2). Clearly, the inland states had less to fear from Athens' sea power.

<sup>61</sup> Andok. ii 11, 14 (*cf.* Dem. xix 286).

<sup>62</sup> Antiphon v 78, with discussion and references in A. W. Gomme, *HCT* i 238 n. 3.

<sup>63</sup> *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 89, 117.

<sup>64</sup> *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 174, 182, and 98.

<sup>65</sup> M. B. Walbank, *Athenian Proxeny of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Toronto 1978) 280–4, for bibliography and commentary.

There is no historical evidence that states were concerned with the trade of non-essential items such as pottery. This is found only in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*; here the curious concept of forbidden imports (*polemia*) is introduced when a sycophant denounces a Megarian and his goods and later a Boiotian and his goods, both of whom are doing business with Dikaiopolis.<sup>66</sup> Despite the hazards of relying on Aristophanes as an historical source, these lines are often used to argue that all imports from enemy countries were banned.<sup>67</sup> In fact, this view finds little support even on the comic stage. In Aristophanes, not only does a charge of *polemia* seem to be dependent on the presence of *polemioi* (Megarian and Boiotian peasants who carry their goods overland to Athens),<sup>68</sup> but it may also require additional charges of a more threatening nature: when the Boiotian is denounced by the sycophant, the denunciation must be justified by a charge of intended treacherous activity in which the Boiotian makes use of the imported goods (the sycophant accuses him of planning to set fire to the docks of the Peiraieus using the lamp wicks he brought with him from Boiotia).<sup>69</sup> Thus, even the *Acharnians* does not suggest a general, unconditional ban on imports from enemy countries. Because of its equivocal nature, its limited applicability to most interstate trade, and its lack of historical parallels, Aristophanes' conception of state interference in the trade of non-essentials or state exclusion of imports from enemy countries is best left on the comic stage.<sup>70</sup>

The absence of such references in the historical record is not surprising, since there would be little benefit to state interference in the trade of non-essential items that served no purpose in the war effort. Prohibiting export to the enemy, for example, might diminish the revenues of an enemy state collected through import, export, harbor, or transit taxes,<sup>71</sup> but such moves could also have a reciprocal effect on local tax collection and eliminate overseas markets for local merchants; besides, such a prohibition would be difficult to enforce. On the other hand, a state would have more control over imports or passage through its territory. Barring imports from enemy states could be easily enforced by harbor officials or tax collectors and would have at least a temporary effect on some of those merchants based in enemy states who dealt in the export trade, but it would also have a direct effect on the home state, diminishing revenues collected through import taxes and depriving its residents of goods. Preventing passage through one's territory would likewise eliminate revenues collected through transit taxes, although here enforcement could be a problem: would passage be denied on the basis of the citizenship of a *naukleros* or an *emporos*, the commodities on board, the port of embarkation or destination?<sup>72</sup>

<sup>66</sup> *Ach.* 819–20, 911–14.

<sup>67</sup> De Ste Croix (n. 12) 238, sees the evidence not only as historical but logical as well. J. H. Lipsius, *Das Attische Recht und Rechtverfahren* (Leipzig 1905–15) 312–13, n. 13, attempts to support Aristophanes with Isok. xvii 42, in which a man is denounced in the early fourth century for loaning money on a ship that belonged to a Delian. Lipsius suggests the ship's cargo was denounced as *polemia* because Delos was hostile toward Athens during the Corinthian War, but there is no evidence that Delos was aligned against Athens or involved in the war. J. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece* (London 1933) 170 n. 3, suggests that denunciation was for loaning money on a ship not destined to return to Athens, a violation of Attic law recorded in [Dem.] xxv 50–1; also see [Dem.] lvi 6 and Lykourg. *Leok.* 26–7. The reference to a law that enemy goods seized belong to the state, following the seizure of a Naukratite's ship in the mid-fourth century, is cryptic since Athens was not at war with Naukratis at this time (Dem. xxiv 12). The seizure appears to be an act of piracy by some enterprising Athenian officials (cf. Dem. ii 28, li 13, Aischin. ii 71).

<sup>68</sup> In addition to these specific charges of *polemia*, the status of goods from Megara and Boiotia as forbidden

imports is implied elsewhere by complaints of their absence because of the war (*Peace* 1000–5, *Ach.* 890, *Lysistrata* 700–3). Only Aristophanes' joke about 'Lakonian' shoes in *Wasps* 1157–69 refers to *polemia* not from these two neighboring states.

<sup>69</sup> *Ach.* 914–24. Interestingly, although laws of *polemia* and *polemioi* would seemingly be reciprocal, there is no suggestion when the Megarian or Boiotian is bartering for Athenian goods that either will be returning home with *polemia*.

<sup>70</sup> As noted by H. Knorringa, *Emporos* (Amsterdam 1926) 127–8.

<sup>71</sup> See J. Velissaropoulos, *Les nauclères grecs* (Geneva 1980) 205–22, for a discussion of state taxes on trade.

<sup>72</sup> For example, with respect to a quantity of building timber shipped from Thurii to Athens, referred to in 408/7 (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 387), E. Erxleben, *Klio* lvii (1975) 373, believes that Corinth would not have permitted its transit through her territory—apparently on the basis of its destination; certainly not its embarkation since Thurii and Corinth were then allied, both at war with Athens (Thuc. viii 61.2). On the other hand, with respect to the 10% transit tax instituted by Athens at Chrysopolis in 410, Velissaropoulos (n. 71) 212 believes that politics would not determine who passed

Perhaps because the resulting economic gains or losses would be so uncertain, there is no evidence for such actions during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>73</sup>

If not for an economic effect, would warring states have prohibited trade for political motives, perhaps to discourage contacts between opposing sides? Although merchants traveling from state to state would seemingly be well situated to act as spies or informers, there is little evidence that states relied on such political intelligence in making military decisions.<sup>74</sup> In fact Perikles' description of Athens as an open city that does not regularly expel foreigners for the purpose of military security was probably characteristic of many Greek states with the exception of Sparta.<sup>75</sup>

Merchants from enemy states need not be politically suspect. In a world of exiles, mercenaries, metics, and similar classes in Greek society, a man's citizenship was not always indicative of his political views,<sup>76</sup> and it is probable that merchants often had a status independent of the contemporary political alignment. Most merchants were neither politically active nor influential, and many apparently were members of 'an international merchant class' who followed markets with little regard to their citizenship or residency.<sup>77</sup>

Because of the heterogeneous and apolitical nature of most overseas trade, merchants would be unlikely targets for official harassment. In this regard the inability to support an economic interpretation of the pre-war Megarian decree is not surprising. As has been shown, Athens was not likely to weaken Megara politically or financially through her merchants since there is no evidence that Megarian merchants were influential or even numerous.<sup>78</sup> Nor could the decree disrupt the supply of vital materials, since it had no effect whatsoever on Megara's ability to work her own land or on her contacts with most overseas (or overland) markets.<sup>79</sup> Rather than

but rather who paid; according to his interpretation of Xen. *Hell.* i 1.22, the toll would be levied only on 'cargos des cités ennemies' (that part of the cargo already destined for enemy ports?), but not on ships headed for Athens or allied ports (what about ships headed for neutral ports?). That states would attempt so to categorize merchants and cargoes and then forgo the collection of revenues on the basis of political considerations of no consequence is unlikely.

<sup>73</sup> Fourth-century references to warfare adversely affecting the collection of state revenue suggest that such losses would result not from laws prohibiting import and export but from threatened naval blockades (Dem. xxiii 110–12, xix 153); and Demosthenes' claim that a blockade would remove Philip's principal source of income refers not to tax revenue but to Philip's plundering of merchant ships (iv 32–4). That military interference in trade could also have a reciprocal effect on the home port is suggested by Athens' loss of tax revenues during the Social War (Isok. viii 19–21, Xen. *Poroi* v 12); a scholiast commenting on Dem. xxi 173 notes that at that time Athens had voted to carry out piracy against those of her enemies sailing the seas, even if they were merchants.

<sup>74</sup> In the well-protected city of Aineas the Tactician, the activities of almost all outsiders, including merchants, are to be officially monitored (x 6–10). On the other hand, Xenophon recommends that merchants be employed as spies, since states always welcome those who import goods; however, Xenophon also cautions against depending on such information (*Hipp.* iv 7–8). See C. G. Starr, *Political Intelligence in Classical Greece* (Leiden 1974) 43, and F. Adcock and D. J. Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London/N.Y. 1975) 174–7.

<sup>75</sup> Thuc. ii 39; see Starr (n. 74) 40, and D. J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (Wiesbaden 1973) 4.

<sup>76</sup> When Thucydides (ii 6.2) claims, for example, that Athens had all Boiotians in Attica arrested at the start of the Peloponnesian War, we can assume that he meant all politically suspect Boiotians, since we know that Boiotian exiles were active at Athens during the war and were honored by the state; see Thuc. iv 76, and *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 73 and 97.

<sup>77</sup> De Ste Croix (n. 12) 264–7. Not surprisingly, merchants were reputed to go wherever market conditions were to their advantage; see Xen. *Oik.* xx 27–8 and [Dem.] xxxiv 36–7 and lvi 8–10. They might also follow campaigning fleets and armies (see for example Thuc. vi 44 or Xen. *Hell.* i 6.37), but their actions here as elsewhere were the result of economic not political motives.

<sup>78</sup> In support of de Ste Croix's argument, (n. 12) 263–4, that much trade at Megara, as at Athens, was in the hands of metics and foreigners unaffected by the decree, see Xen. *Hell.* i 6.32, with Dem. xxiii 212; Dem. xxix 3; Lykourg. *Leok.* 21–7; and D. Whitehead, *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Cambridge 1977) 77, 90–1, for comments concerning the existence of the *metoiken* and *prostates* requirements at Megara.

<sup>79</sup> Megara's small population may have been largely self-sufficient. Thucydides specifically identifies Athens' ravaging invasions of the Megarid as the cause of her suffering in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, in addition to similar raids by Megarian exiles based at Pegai (Thuc. iv 66.1, ii 31.2). No reference is made to Megarian distress caused by an elimination of commercial traffic through her western port in the years before 424, or by the Athenian occupation of Nisaia from 424 to perhaps 409 (Thuc. iv 69, 118.4, 119.2, Diod. xiii 65.1). Of course when the Megarian Decree was in effect Megara could work her land and had control of both Pegai and Nisaia. If Megarians wished to buy imported grain, sources within Greece included Boio-

pursuing a useless commercial policy broadly aimed at Megarian merchants, Athens probably had in mind something more effective and enforceable. While the exclusion from the agora clause permits a religious interpretation with Megara's ruling oligarchs the apparent target,<sup>80</sup> exclusion from the harbors suggests a more politically inspired decree, and here the probable target would be Megarians with ties to political leaders in the numerous Megarian colonies in the Empire's Hellenistic and Euxine districts.<sup>81</sup> During this critical period most channels of trade would have remained open, just as they did once the Peloponnesian War began.

Thus the continued pottery trade between Corinth and Athens during the Peloponnesian War is not inconsistent with our historical evidence. In addition to insuring the import of essential materials, states during wartime also discouraged the export of strategic materials to the enemy; action taken against other forms of trade appears to have been either sporadic or restricted in time and place. Regular interference in the trade of non-essential items was simply not a worthwhile state policy.

BRIAN R. MACDONALD

4247 Locust St., Apt. 12,  
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104

tia, the Peloponnesians, or Thessaly, while the quickest, most direct overseas route would be to the markets of Italy and Sicily. Ironically those who like to see a strong connection between politics and trade in the Megarian decree usually assume that Megara had a close, almost dependent, economic relationship with the Athenian Empire in the years before the decree's passage.

<sup>80</sup> De Ste Croix (n. 12) 267-84. A commercial interpretation of the agora exclusion is also weak. In addition to the enforcement problems that exclusion from a large ill-defined market would entail, the nature of commercial activities in Athens' marketplace deserves consideration. All our sources suggest a local retail trade in which services were provided and natural and manufactured products were sold in small quantities to fulfill the needs of daily life; see R. E. Wycherley, *The Athenian Agora* iii (Princeton 1957) 185-206; A. N. Oikonomides, *The Two Agoras of Ancient Athens* (Chicago 1964) 83-100. Exclusion from such a market

would have little impact on most Megarians as either buyers or sellers.

<sup>81</sup> That the Peloponnesians were hoping to fragment the Athenian Empire is shown in their demands that Athens abandon Poteidaia, give Aigina her independence and the Hellenes their freedom; the call to repeal the Megarian decree, grouped with these other demands (Thuc. i 139.1, 140.3), apparently had the same goal in mind. Influential Megarians at, for example, Byzantion, Astakos, Chalkidon, Mesembria, Herakleia, or Selymbria may have achieved similar results to the Corinthians at Poteidaia. Perikles' demand that Sparta not expel politically suspect individuals (Athenians and their allies) and grant her allies political freedom corresponds to the Spartan demands (Thuc. i 144.2). That Athens had reason to fear Megarian interference in the Hellenistic district is shown by the surprisingly strong representation of Megarians in the area during the Dekeleian War (see Thuc. viii 6.1, 80.3; Xen. *Hell.* i 1.36, 3.15).